We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for allowing PT in research-intensive industries. We find that quality may be higher with than without PT, depending on how consumers' preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus may rise in the source country, or fall in the destination country of PT.
Introduction
Parallel trade (PT) refers to the purchase of patented or trademarked products in one country, and the subsequent export of those products to another country, without the consent of the intellectual property rights (IPR) owner. 1 The question whether PT should be permitted or banned has received growing attention in the public debate and in the academic literature. This policy issue is particularly relevant in researchintensive industries, such as pharmaceuticals. It is widely held that PT entails a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency: the supposed positive ex post (i.e. when R&D investment is sunk) welfare effects of allowing free circulation of goods should be weighed against the alleged negative ex ante impact on investment incentives.
In this paper, we revisit the impact of PT on product quality, and thereby on consumer and social welfare. We consider a vertical pricing model of PT with endogenous quality choice where the IPR owner sells directly at home, and abroad through an independent firm.
While most theoretical models assume that the mere threat of PT leads to global uniform pricing, our model exhibits both parallel imports and third-degree retail price discrimination at equilibrium (even with no arbitrage cost). Indeed, there is evidence that PT has gained large market shares but has not yet resulted in price convergence across relevant countries. 2 We find some results that run counter to the prevailing wisdom. First, product quality may be higher with than without PT, depending on how consumers' preferences for quality differ across countries. Second, with endogenous quality consumer surplus may rise in the source country, or fall in the destination country of PT. Third, PT reduces ex post global welfare. We show that improving quality is a necessary condition for PT to increase welfare ex ante (we provide a sufficient condition in an example with linear demand and quadratic R&D cost). 1 The exercise of PT hinges on the territorial exhaustion of IPR. The European Union (EU) has adopted a regime of regional exhaustion where IPR are ended upon first sale in Member States, thereby allowing free trade among them, but still hold outside the region. United States have chosen national exhaustion, where IPR owners may prevent imports. Developing countries have chosen international exhaustion, with complete trade liberalization.
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Much of the literature agrees that PT has positive ex post welfare effects when all markets are served (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994) , but leads to lower investment ex ante (Li and Maskus, 2006; Alexandrov and Deb, 2012) . Valletti (2006) finds that investment in quality can be higher under international exhaustion when differential pricing between countries is cost-based rather than demandbased. Nonetheless, higher investment under international exhaustion never yields higher global welfare. In a regulated setting, Grossman and Lai (2008) find that international exhaustion may boost innovation and local consumer surplus.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 assesses quality under PT. Section 4 analyzes welfare. Section 5 discusses an example. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We set up a two-country model where a manufacturer (firm M) sells a product in country 1 through a controlled subsidiary, and in country 2 through an independent distributor (firm D). The latter may parallel export the product to country 1 at no cost (qualitative results hold if the arbitrage cost is sufficiently low: see footnote 7). Retailing costs are normalized to zero.
We consider a three-stage game. At stage one, firm M carries out R&D and sets product quality ‫ݔ‬ 0 at cost ‫ܥ‬ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ, where ‫ܥ‬ ᇱ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ 0 and ‫ܥ‬ ᇱᇱ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ 0. At stage two, firm M manufactures the product (without loss of generality, marginal costs are normalized to zero) and sets the unit wholesale price w to firm D. At stage three, firm D sets the retail quantity (or price) in country 2. In country 1, should PT take place, firms compete in quantities.
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Consumers in the two countries differ in their willingness to pay (wtp) for the product and in their marginal valuation of quality, because of cross-country differences in income and/or product needs.
Let ܷ ሺ‫,ݖ‬ ‫ݔ‬ሻ ൌ ‫ݖ‬ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ be the utility of a consumer of type ‫ݖ‬ that buys a product of quality ‫ݔ‬ in country j (݆ ൌ 1,2). We assume that ‫ݖ‬ is uniformly distributed between െ∞ and ߙ 0, thus avoiding 4 that all types buy. Consumers in country j are homogeneous in their preference for quality ‫ݒ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ 0.
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We assume that ‫ݒ‬ ′ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ 0. 5 For convenience we will sometimes use primes to denote derivatives of functions with respect to (wrt) their arguments.
A consumer of type ‫ݖ‬ in country j (݆ ൌ 1,2) buys the product at price ‫‬ if ‫ݖ‬ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ െ ‫‬ 0 (if the net utility is negative, ‫ݖ‬ will not buy). Hence, types for which ‫ݖ‬ ‫‬ െ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ enter the market.
Given their uniform distribution, there are ߙ െ ሺ‫‬ െ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻሻ active consumers and thus ܳ ൌ ߙ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ െ ‫‬ is the total quantity sold in country j. Let ܽ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ ൌ ߙ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ (note that ܽ ′ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ 0).
Then, ‫‬ ൌ ܽ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ െ ܳ is the inverse demand curve in country j. In country 1, when PT takes place we have ܳ ଵ ൌ ‫ݍ‬ ଵ ‫ݍ‬ ௧ , where ‫ݍ‬ ଵ is the quantity sold by firm M and ‫ݍ‬ ௧ are parallel imports. In country 2, the monopolist firm D sells ܳ ଶ ൌ ‫ݍ‬ ଶ .
We avoid corner solutions where PT is deterred or blocked, or market 2 is closed with PT. For this purpose, we assume that demand dispersion between countries is not too high, in the sense that consumers' maximum wtp in country 1 is not too much higher than in country 2. Table 1 . Firms' profit functions, consumer surplus and global welfare in both regimes.
Product quality
Let us analyze the impact of PT on investment incentives. Thus, we derive product quality under regime ݊ (section 3.1), regime ݅ (section 3.2), and compare the results (section 3.3).
National exhaustion
In regime ݊, firm M is a monopoly in country 1 and firm D a monopoly in country 2. 
provided that the second-order condition (SOC) holds, namely,
Let ‫ݔ‬ be the solution to (1).
International exhaustion
In regime ݅, at stage three firm M and firm D compete à la Cournot in country 1, while firm D is a monopoly in country 2. Hence, the equilibrium quantities are:
Let ‫ݓ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ be the price that derives from the FOC on firm M's profit at stage two:
From Assumption 1, for a given quality firm M raises the wholesale price relative to regime ݊ to effectively control PT. 7 Since ‫ݓ߲‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ ‫ݔ߲‬ ⁄ 0, then the wholesale price rises with quality.
6 At stages two and three, the SOCs are always fulfilled in both regimes.
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Inserting ‫ݓ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ into (2), we find that:
Given (5) and (6), Assumption 1 ensures that ‫ݍ‬ ௧ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ 0 and ‫ݍ‬ ଶ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ 0.
From (5), we have
. Thus, parallel imports may rise or fall with quality depending on whether the marginal valuation of quality is respectively higher or lower in country 1 than in country 2. Given that
ൌ െ‫ݍ‬ ௧ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ ൏ 0, namely, parallel imports reduce firm M's profit, when ܽ ଶ ᇱ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ ܽ ଵ ᇱ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ firm M may strategically raise investment in quality to effectively control PT.
At stage one, product quality derives from the FOC on firm M's profit wrt ‫ݔ‬ (assuming an interior solution):
provided that the SOC is fulfilled, namely,
డ௫ మ ൏ 0. Let ‫ݔ‬ be the solution to (7).
Comparison
We find that PT per se does not reduce investment. 8 Proposition 1 shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for PT to increase investment (and thereby product quality) is that consumers in country 2 have a higher marginal wtp for quality than consumers in country 1. 7 We can find that Assumption 1 excludes that ‫ݓ‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ 
Welfare analysis
Consider now how PT affects consumer surplus (section 4.1) and social welfare (section 4.2).
Consumer surplus
We show that total ex post consumer surplus is higher with than without PT. For any given quality, PT raises (respectively, reduces) the quantity sold in country 1 (country 2). Thus, PT raises consumer surplus in the destination country but reduces surplus in the source country.
Interestingly, we show that the ex ante analysis may yield opposite results. If PT raises (respectively, reduces) investment, and thereby the quantity sold, then consumer surplus in the source (destination) country of PT may be higher (lower) in regime ݅ than in regime ݊. Consider now the first stage of the game. As regards country 2, from sections 3.1 and 3.2 we find that
Proposition 2. Ex post (for any given quality) consumer surplus falls in the source country, and rises in the destination country of PT. Ex ante (considering investment) consumer surplus may rise in
. Then, we find:
and thus ܵ ଶ ൫‫ݔ‬ ൯ ܵ ଶ ሺ‫ݔ‬ ሻ when ܽ ଶ ൫‫ݔ‬ ൯ െ ܽ ଶ ሺ‫ݔ‬ ሻ ‫ݓ2‬ ௧ ൫‫ݔ‬ ൯.
As regards country 1, we have: In section 5, we will illustrate the above conditions in an example.
At the world level, from (3)െ(6) we can find that
ଶ଼଼଼ 0 (under Assumption 1). Thus, PT raises ex post consumer surplus. We can prove that PT has ambiguous effects on the ex ante total consumer surplus.
Social welfare
We find that PT reduces ex post global welfare. For a given quality, the adverse effect of PT on industry profits (although firm D's profit may rise under PT, this does not offset firm M's profit loss) outweighs the positive effect on total consumer surplus. 9 We show that, for PT to improve ex ante global welfare, quality should improve in regime ݅ relative to regime ݊. Consider now global welfare at the first stage. Let quality be lower with than without PT (i.e.
‫ݔ‬ ൏ ‫ݔ‬
). Since 
We have proved that, at stage two,
Thus, our vertical pricing model of PT reverses the standard result based on the classic theory of third-degree price discrimination that PT improves ex post welfare when demand dispersion is small enough that all countries are served under PT (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994) .
An example
To proceed further in the welfare analysis, we consider an example with a quadratic cost of R&D and a demand that is linear in quality. Thus, let ‫ܥ‬ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ ൌ ߮ Our main purpose is to find a sufficient condition for ex ante global welfare to improve under PT. 
Concluding remarks
We have studied the welfare effects of PT considering investment in quality. We have thus revisited the case for a regime of international exhaustion of IPR in high-R&D industries. 
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We have found that quality is higher in an equilibrium with PT, provided that consumers' marginal valuation of quality is higher abroad than at home. In such a case, the manufacturer raises investment to effectively control PT. When quality is higher (respectively, lower) with than without PT, consumer surplus may rise (fall) in the source (destination) country of PT, thereby reversing the anticipated ex post effects of PT on consumers' well-being.
For a given quality, the adverse effect of PT on industry profits outweighs the positive effect on total consumer surplus. Thus, PT reduces ex post global welfare. Improving product quality is a necessary and sometimes sufficient condition for PT to increase welfare ex ante.
Future work may investigate whether the results are robust to considering asymmetric price regulation between countries, and a competitive market for parallel imports.
